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Recession and recovery: The Welsh Office and job creation in the 1980s.  
 
The 1980s are remembered as difficult times for much of Wales, when the economy was 
subject to dramatic shocks, including the closure of almost the entire deep coal mine industry 
as well as enormous job losses in manufacturing and steel. While the Welsh Office’s role in 
job creation, especially its focus on inward investment, has been discussed in the literature,
1
 a 
narrative often remains in contemporary Wales that it was left almost undefended against the 
economic and political forces symbolised by Margaret Thatcher. Although the economy 
suffered greatly in the early to mid-1980s, largely as a result of central government policies, 
the activities of the Welsh Office
2
 and its agencies in seeking to create jobs are often 
overlooked. 
 
The complexities of administrative devolution meant that economic policies were largely 
controlled by central government, the Welsh Office, or by a gradually evolving combination. 
However, the Welsh Office’s powers were limited. It had no influence over fiscal and 
monetary issues such as interest rates and taxation, nor the level of government expenditure. 
As well as these, decisions on the nationalised steel and coal industries were also taken by 
central government. Despite these limitations, the actively interventionist John Morris, 
Labour’s Secretary of State for Wales between 1974 and 1979, had put in place powerful 
economic development agencies that enabled the Welsh Office to intervene. It was these that 
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were used effectively throughout the 1980s by Conservative Secretaries of State. This article 
aims to include such activities in historical debate, as well as explaining the constraints on 
Welsh Office activity. It argues that while central government's policies changed dramatically 
in 1979 to the immediate detriment of the Welsh economy, the Secretaries of State for Wales 
(Nicholas Edwards between 1979 and 1987, Peter Walker between 1987 and 1990) ensured 
that the Welsh Office remained an actively interventionist body that used all of its limited 
powers and resources to offset the impact of economic turbulence. 
 
Wales’ economic problems did not start in 1979. After the Second World War, memories of 
the great depression spurred the creation of a consensus approach to economic policy making 
throughout the UK. This included 'regional policy', which transferred jobs from more 
prosperous regions to less successful areas. For example, Industrial Development Certificates 
were generally needed to construct factories anywhere in the UK.
3
 These were usually far 
easier to obtain in government defined 'development areas', such as those in Wales. 
Governments also provided other inducements, such as the construction of factories.
4
 By the 
late 1960s, such policies had helped Wales regain a measure of prosperity, with the Western 
Mail claiming that its economy 'had forged ahead at a pace unequalled by any other area of 
comparable size in Britain'.
5
 However, the economic picture darkened throughout the 1970s. 
A simultaneous rise in inflation and unemployment (‘stagflation’) led to a reassessment of the 
consensus approach. At the same time, deindustrialisation meant that there was no longer a 
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supply of new factories that could be diverted from successful regions.
6
 By the later 1970s, 
regional policy was in sharp decline.
7
 However, the Welsh economy was not in immediate 
crisis before 1979. For example, by 1976, 30 years of regional policy had helped ensure that 
there were over 50 factories employing more than 1,000 people (such as Hoover in Merthyr 
Tydfil and ICI in Pontypool), with 105 employing more than 500.
8
 At the same time, despite 
the rapid run-down of the coal industry in the 1960s and closures in the steel industry in the 
late 1970s, these nationalised industries still employed some 80,000 people.
9
 However, 
economic and political pressures were mounting, with John Morris noting in 1979 that 
‘despite all our efforts, we have to run very hard to stand still in terms of jobs’.10 
 
While Wales may have been standing still in economic terms, the perception elsewhere was 
that the UK was locked into relative decline. Following the self-immolation of the trades 
unions in the 1978-79 ‘winter of discontent’, the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher won 
the general election of May 1979. They aimed to confront economic problems through a 
radical programme that aimed to strengthen private enterprise and restrict the role of the state, 
especially through the rationalization and privatisation of nationalised industries. Such 
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policies were to have drastic implications, especially in Wales with its relatively high 
dependence on traditional industry. Monetarist attempts to control inflation through higher 
interest rates created a high pound, making exports more expensive, while reductions in 
government expenditure and tax increases decreased domestic demand. Manufacturing 
slumped, as factories opened during the post-war ‘golden age’ of economic expansion were 
unable to survive. Between 1979 and 1983, the number of such employees dropped by 36.0 
per cent in Wales, with overall employee levels dropping by 13.8 per cent.
11
 At the same 
time, central government had little appetite for traditional regional policy, and soon scrapped 
the Industrial Development Certificate system. 
 
The change of government was also to have far-reaching implications for the nationalised 
industries of coal and steel. In 1979-80, their Welsh operations received some £274 million in 
government support, a sum which increased to over £800 million in the following year. This 
was some 17 per cent of all identifiable public expenditure in Wales,
12
 more than was spent 
on either education or health.
13
 While rationalisation within steel had been on-going 
throughout the later 1970s, the new government was determined to speed up the process and 
thus reduce subsidies. This led to the 1979 announcement of the slim-line programme, 
involving the loss of 11,000 jobs at Port Talbot and Llanwern,
14
 and the ending of steel 
production at Shotton. The sense of crisis was summed up by Nicholas Edwards, who 
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informed Margaret Thatcher in April 1980 that it was ‘hard to overstate the sense of 
despondency and desolation that is present at all levels within the [steel] industry at 
present’.15 By 1983, 21,180 employees remained, reduced from 51,780 in 1979.16  The Welsh 
Office had no formal role within steel, and attempts to exercise informal influence were 
unsuccessful. For example, Nicholas Edwards wrote to Margaret Thatcher in mid-1980 
outlining an approach that would create government supported regional companies, at least in 
the short-term.
17
 However, this was not acted upon,
18
 with the Prime Minister noting 
elsewhere that she was ‘somewhat astonished at the lack of consultation’ with the Welsh 
Office from other parts of government following the job losses at Shotton.
19
  
 
After the relative stability of much of the 1970s, the fortunes of the Welsh coal industry also 
took a sharp turn for the worse. Demand was reducing and the industry was struggling with 
high operating costs. Crucially, the National Union of Mineworkers and the government were 
implacable opponents, with the government being keen to prevent the miners from repeating 
their role in the 1974 defeat of Edward Heath. While the Welsh Office was again excluded 
from the formal decision making process around coal, the political and financial issues were 
such that it was reluctant to seek any involvement. For example, Derek Ezra, the National 
Coal Board Chairman, secretly proposed in 1980 that the South Wales Coalfield be placed 
under the control of the Welsh Office 'to solve the area's problems in a Welsh context'.
20
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However, this was rejected,
21
 probably as the crucial decisions over subsidy would have been 
retained by London, meaning that the Secretary of State would have been in the 
uncomfortable position of having accountability without full authority. Productivity remained 
below the UK average and heavy losses continued during the early 1980s. For example, the 
steel plant at Port Talbot found that it was cheaper to ship in coking coal from Australia than 
use that mined locally. Plans to exploit the reserves located underneath the plant itself were 
never executed, with the local MP, John Morris, stating that it would be ‘foolhardy’ to 
develop these at the expense of saddling the steelworks with coal that was ‘totally 
uneconomic'.
22
 However, the fortunes of the industries diverged after the bitter and protracted 
coal strike of 1984-85. While the state-owned British Steel Corporation was being prepared 
for privatisation and continued as a major producer, the coal industry was now in rapid 
decline as government had little interest in ensuring its continuation. 
 
Overall, the turmoil of the early 1980s and the accompanying social impact led to a profound 
sense of shock. Many of the industries on which the economy had been built were in a state 
of virtual collapse. In 1979, 68,000 people in Wales were unemployed, but some 166,000 
were without work by 1985. In December 1980, the Western Mail warned of ‘an economic 
and social disaster of a scale not witnessed since the depression [of the 1930s]’.23 Earlier in 
the same year, Nicholas Edwards warned the Prime Minister about ‘a sense of crisis and 
genuine fears of a return to the 1930s '...' there is a compelling need to create hope’ when 
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discussing the steel industry,
24
 while on a visit to Cardiff in 1980, Lord Kaldor, the architect 
of 1960's regional policy, described monetarism as ‘a terrible curse–a visitation of evil spirits 
that has devastated our country’.25 
 
The new government’s commitment to change was tempered by recognition that, in Wales at 
least, some type of regional policy was required. According to the 1979 Conservative 
manifesto for Wales, it was to ‘continue the policy of successive governments which have 
used financial assistance to prepare sites, remove derelict land and encourage the arrival of 
new industry. An effective regional policy will be needed for the foreseeable future’.26 
Within this approach, the Welsh Office did have some powers and resources. It was able to 
decide which companies were awarded grant under the Regional Selective Assistance 
scheme.  Despite this, maximum levels of support and eligibility rules were decided by 
central government, while a parallel scheme controlled by central government saw substantial 
budget reductions before being withdrawn completely. However, the most prominent areas of 
influence related to the development agencies created by the previous administration. These 
were the Welsh Development Agency (WDA), the Development Board for Rural Wales 
(DBRW) and the Land Authority for Wales. Although these were mostly funded by the 
Welsh Office, each had their own remit and board to ensure that they were able to operate at 
'arms length',
27
 so as to ensure greater flexibility. The most powerful was the WDA, whose 
remit gave it the ability to promote Wales as an investment location, reclaim derelict land, 
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develop industrial sites and premises, and assist the ‘establishment, growth, modernisation or 
development of an industry or any undertaking in an industry’.28 Spending by the Welsh 
Office and its agencies tended to fall into a number of categories, including the reclamation 
of derelict land, factory construction and urban regeneration, attraction of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and support for indigenous businesses. 
 
The most prominent was the reclamation of derelict land. Estimates of the amount of such 
land varied, but the Welsh Office identified 2,685 sites in 1975.
29
 Over seventy per cent were 
found in south Wales, mainly related to metal smelting or coal, with the coal tips alone 
containing more than 300 million tonnes of waste.
30
 However, significant pockets existed 
elsewhere, such as the 149 slate-related sites in north west Wales. Dereliction inevitably had 
a depressing impact on adjacent communities, with the WDA’s Chief Executive supporting 
reclamation as he didn’t want ‘people to feel like they were living in a museum’.31 At the 
same time, many sites presented environmental risks, with a 1982 survey identifying 703 
contaminated sites, 66 of which contained significant hazards such as toxic chemicals.
32
 
Finally, the congested topography of the south Wales valleys meant that there was often 
limited space to construct new factories, unless sites were reclaimed. 
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Land reclamation had been a Welsh Office priority since the Aberfan disaster of 1966.
33
 This 
programme was continued after 1979, while industrial decline ensured that the supply of 
derelict land remained high. The WDA did not generally reclaim land itself, instead 
contracting this work out via local authorities, but its role as a grant provider allowed it to 
prioritise and oversee reclamation. When assessing potential sites, the highest priority was 
accorded to those with safety, flooding or contamination issues, the second was for sites with 
potential to be reused for factories or housing, and the third was those with potential for 
leisure usage or general environmental enhancement.
34
 By 1981, the WDA had reclaimed 
2,900 acres (4.5 square miles) of land across 108 schemes since 1976.
35
 Between 1979–80 
and 1989-90, some 8,100 acres (12.7 sq. miles) were reclaimed.
36
 Plates 1 and 2 show the 
dramatic results of a typical scheme.  
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Plate 1: Ogilvie colliery site, Rhymney Valley, before reclamation. 
 
Plate 2: Ogilvie colliery site after reclamation, 1984-85. 
 
 
11 
 
As well as land clearance, the Welsh Office was able to broaden its focus towards urban 
regeneration once the immediate impact of the slump had subsided. Although such activities 
were to become more prominent in the 1990s, it was in the early to mid-1980s that the Welsh 
Office and local government laid the foundations for the Cardiff Bay redevelopment. At the 
same time, the former steelworks site at Ebbw Vale was reclaimed for a garden festival in 
1992, while an urban development programme was put in place to begin the process of 
restoring the fabric of Wales’ towns and cities. As part of the general focus on land 
development, the Land Authority for Wales was active in assembling packages of land for 
commercial and industrial uses, which it was able to do with the support of its compulsory 
purchase powers, although these were rarely used.
37
 
 
Land reclamation was hugely successful, not just in terms of improving the environment and 
releasing land for development, but also in changing the public face of much of Wales. Most 
of this activity would not have taken place without Welsh Office support, as the commercial 
value of reclaimed land rarely exceeded the cost of remediation. For example, the private 
sector would not have carried out such work in more peripheral areas such as the Heads of 
the Valleys. Commercial investment would then have clustered to an even greater extent in 
more accessible areas such as the eastern reaches of the M4 and A55, which had traditionally 
found it easier to attract investment due to infrastructural and demographic advantages. As 
well as economic benefits, land clearance also had positive impacts on the morale of 
surrounding areas, especially given that large amounts of reclaimed land were not reused for 
development, instead being used for leisure or forestry. The removal of unsightly dereliction 
helped demonstrate that something was being done to tackle the physical residue of 
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deindustrialisation.  However, any such positives have to be set against the very difficult 
circumstances of the time, especially in areas affected by the run-down of coal, which left a 
legacy of deep bitterness. 
 
The second area of activity included the development of industrial sites and the construction 
of advance factories. These were units that were built speculatively and then marketed to 
occupiers. As a result of the ‘slim-lining’ of the steel industry, the WDA announced a 
construction programme of 356 factories between December 1979 and March 1980, 
comprising some 2.4 million sq. ft. of space. This was also spurred by the realisation that 
economic conditions meant that private sector developers were unwilling to construct 
factories throughout much of Wales.
38
 The Welsh Office was thus prepared to continue and 
extend the large-scale construction programmes announced before 1979. The scale and speed 
of construction was recognised as being unparalleled, with the Secretary of State for Industry, 
Keith Joseph, noting in 1980 that the funding for factory construction in the Shotton area 
could not be matched elsewhere in the UK.
39
 While rural Wales was not directly affected by 
the steel run-down, the DBRW was also developing factories and sites.  
 
Following the building programmes of the early 1980s, factory completions rapidly fell back. 
These peaked in 1981–82 at some 2.5 million sq. ft, but had reduced to some 0.3 million sq. 
ft. by 1984-85.
40
 The increase in supply soon exceeded demand, leading the WDA to state 
that as a result of 383 unoccupied factories, it was to ‘restrict further buildings of advance 
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factories to specific locations where there is a shortage of particular sizes of buildings’.41 
Instead, there was a concentration on locations with most potential, so as to provide the 
greatest scope for job creation, although there was resistance amongst local authorities in the 
Valleys, who were naturally keen to see greater activity in their areas.
42
 As well as building 
standard factories, the WDA also constructed properties more suited to high technology 
companies, although these remained a small proportion of its activity.
43
 Factory construction 
was also scaled back in mid-Wales, with the DBRW being advised by the Welsh Office in 
mid-1984 that additional factory building depended to a large extent upon the sale of its 
existing assets.
44
 Despite this, factory numbers almost doubled to some 500 between 1982 
and 1986-87.
45
 As well as building speculative factories, the board also provided bespoke 
premises, such as that built for Laura Ashley in Newtown in 1986-87.
46
 Overall, some 10 
million sq. ft. was constructed by the WDA between 1979-80 and 1989-90.
47
 However, this 
was dwarfed by the scale of the industrial collapse, with the Secretary of State noting that 
‘even this massive programme will not provide new factory space for every single job to be 
lost.’48 While 44,000 people were working in factories owned by the agency by 1984-85,49 
unemployment was at almost four times this level. However, factory programmes provided 
some immediate relief and enabled the creation of a large number of jobs by companies 
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taking up these units. Factory construction would generally not have taken place without the 
involvement of the Welsh Office and its agencies, while it was also critical to FDI (Foreign 
Direct Investment), soon to become the Welsh Office’s greatest success.  
 
While the clearance of land and the construction of factories were significant achievements, 
they would not enable longer-term job creation without investment from companies, either 
those based in Wales (indigenous), or overseas (FDI). This was well recognised, with 
Nicholas Edwards stating in 1981 that he was ‘desperately anxious to achieve a broadening of 
the industrial base in Wales'.
50
 By the early 1980s, the WDA was increasingly focusing on 
attracting FDI. For example, its overseas marketing activities in 1984 included a marketing 
campaign in six cities in the United States, operated jointly with the DBRW.
51
 By the later 
1980s, Wales was one of the UK’s strongest areas in terms of FDI, and was capturing up to 
17 per cent of recorded investment in the UK.
52
 It was successful in attracting companies in 
sectors including electronics (such as Sharp in Wrexham) and automotive (such as Toyota in 
Deeside). By the end of the decade, FDI was well established as a flagship activity for the 
Welsh Office and its agencies. According the Welsh Office’s industrial advisor, 'We were 
able to promote this very dynamic package “We can give you premises, we can give you 
grants, we can give you a good labour force, we can give you a cheap labour force, we can 
give you loans, cheap loans from the European Community.”53 For example, Peter Walker 
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led the successful drive to attract a large Bosch automotive component factory to south 
Wales, intervening to ensure that planning obstacles were overcome.
54
  
 
The extent of Wales’ success created friction within government by 1981, symbolised by 
Nissan, which was searching for a location suitable for a car factory. During this process, 
Nicholas Edwards met with Nissan’s Managing Director in Toyko, which prompted Keith 
Joseph to write a rebuke on the grounds that an undertaking had been given that Nissan 
would not be contacted.
55
 A furious correspondence then followed, with the Welsh Office 
minister stating that the part of central government responsible for FDI sometimes appeared 
to ‘regard the Welsh Office with deep hostility’.56 This foreshadowed a growing sense of 
resentment towards Wales with its active FDI policies, although Nissan eventually went to 
Sunderland. Overall, while Wales' low cost base and access to Europe were the main reasons 
for its success, the ability of the Welsh Office and its agencies to put in place factories, grants 
and infrastructure which were then aggressively marketed to potential investors was also very 
important. At the same time, FDI was not generally the low wage environment it was 
sometimes accused of being, with its manufacturing wages being usually above those in 
much of the service sector, but less than in traditional industries such as coal and steel.
57
 
However, its relatively small volume (creating an average of some 3,400 new jobs per 
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annum)
58
 meant that it could only be a small part of an effective response to Wales’ 
problems. Despite this, a combination of its undeniable success and the way in which it 
offered good publicity through the announcement of investments, led FDI to assume a 
totemic status by the end of the decade that was in excess of its actual achievements. 
 
The Welsh Office was also able to award grants to companies under the Regional Selective 
Assistance scheme. For example, applications from 209 companies were approved in 1984-
85. These were expected to create some 10,000 new jobs,
59
 although actual out-turn figures 
were not collected. However, Welsh owned companies accounted for less than four per cent 
of the total aid awarded between 1979 and 1983.
60
 While grant schemes were open to all 
applicants, their main focus was the manufacturing sector. However, this was dominated by 
companies headquartered outside Wales, with Welsh firms tending to be small. For example, 
the Welsh Office stated in 1983 that it was aware of only two Welsh companies (Laura 
Ashley and AB Electronics) that were sufficiently successful to have opened overseas 
manufacturing branches.
61
 This meant that while the Welsh Office was keen to encourage 
indigenous applications, the demand for grants was inevitably dominated by overseas 
companies. 
 
Welsh Office attempts to support indigenous businesses took two main forms. The first 
sought to enhance access to finance. The existence of an investment gap that prevented 
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businesses from obtaining loans and investment from commercial providers such as banks 
had long been the subject of debate, with the Welsh Office using the WDA since the mid-
1970s to provide such support. However, the period immediately after 1979 saw a reduced 
emphasis on such activity.
62
 This was caused by a combination of the emphasis on factory 
construction and the failure of a large (£2 million) investment in P.Leiner Ltd, a Treforest 
based gelatine producer, whose bankruptcy highlighted the difficulty faced by the WDA 
when investing. The point of such support was to add to, and not duplicate, existing sources 
such as banks. The WDA was thus acting as a lender of last resort, as it was seeking to 
support companies that had difficulty in obtaining finance from traditional sources. This 
meant that there was inevitably going to be a high failure rate, but it was often politically 
unacceptable to make a large loss on an individual project.  
 
Between 1978-79 and 1980-81, the WDA invested some £10 million. However, between 
1981-82 and 1984-85, investments were made in 300 companies, totalling some £24 
million.
63
 The focus remained industrial investment, with the service sector accounting for 
only 16.6 per cent by 1987.
64
 However, the WDA’s investments did not perform well in 
overall terms, with the agency failing to meet its own rate of return targets. By the end of the 
decade, the WDA had been unable to record a positive cumulative return after 1982-83, 
meaning that the agency was unable to assemble a profitable portfolio. Given the agency’s 
local knowledge, this meant that there was a shortage of commercially viable projects, with a 
Welsh Office minister, Wyn Roberts, later stating that ‘there were never enough local 
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entrepreneurs’.65 However, the agency saw its investments as not only supporting businesses, 
but also building confidence, so was thus prepared to absorb some losses as part of its overall 
drive to increase ‘levels of commercial spirit’.66  
 
As well as providing finance, the Welsh Office also placed emphasis on the encouragement 
of indigenous enterprise through the provision of training and support services. By 1985-86, 
the WDA had offered professional advice to 7,000 companies in that year, with its Small 
Firms Centre responding to enquiries from 22,000 individuals or companies.
67
 Also, the 
DBRW was active in a broader business support role, and had set up a series of centres to 
offer advice and support to entrepreneurs by 1987. Finally, the Wales Tourist Board 
continued to market Wales as a holiday destination, and provided limited grant support for 
the improvement of visitor facilities. However, its limited resources combined with the 
difficulty of competing against overseas destinations meant that its task was difficult, with the 
Welsh Office's Permanent Secretary stating in 1982 that its resources gave 'pretty small 
leverage' within the industry.
68
 
 
By the end of the 1980s, success in attracting FDI combined with a general economic upturn 
across the UK led to the emergence of some optimism in Wales, skilfully boosted by Peter 
Walker, a committed interventionist. Unemployment was falling towards UK average levels, 
while business activity was increasing. Although the number of manufacturing employees in 
1990 remained some 30 per cent below its 1979 level, service sector growth had enabled 
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overall employee numbers to recover to within 4 per cent,
69
 while self-employment had 
grown dramatically. However, Wales’ output per head was the second lowest of all UK areas 
throughout the decade, while other indicators such as average wage levels also placed it in 
low relative positions. Any optimism that relative decline had been halted or reversed was 
short-lived, and such decline recommenced in the mid-1990s. 
 
Overall, the Welsh Office of the 1980s presided over intervention of a volume and type that 
would not have occurred in the absence of administrative devolution, and did not occur in the 
English regions. This approach was outlined by the Secretary of State for Wales in a 1979 
briefing to the Prime Minister, where he discussed the ‘continuing need for bodies such as the 
Welsh Development Agency, the Development Board for Rural Wales and the Welsh Tourist 
Board to be allowed to pursue distinctive policies. The justification for having such 
organisations is that they can respond to local circumstances’.70At the same time, while the 
Welsh Office was using its powers in a way that was far more interventionist than the 
approach taken by central government, these powers were limited and there were no 
significant differences between Conservative Secretaries of State and central government on 
the great economic issues of the time. The Welsh Office was instead motivated by the reality 
of decline and dislocation, while its agencies offered the opportunity to intervene within the 
confines of their remits. They also offered opportunities to generate favourable publicity. As 
well as this, Wales is a small part of the UK. While its natural resources had placed it at the 
heart of the industrial revolution, a position which organised labour later translated into a 
strong political presence at Westminster, these dynamics had decayed by the 1980s. In many 
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respects, the Welsh Office was treated as a backwater and was left to its own devices. Central 
government had little reason to object to its interventions, with Nicholas Edwards noting that 
he ‘had the almost unqualified support from the Prime Minister '…' she backed me absolutely 
to the hilt’,71 as they had little impact, or visibility, at a UK level, while Peter Walker 
expressed similar sentiments.
72
 
 
Despite this, the recession was so deep that the Welsh Office’s relatively limited powers and 
budgets could do little to alleviate the situation in the short-term. For example, when the 
Secretary of State declared in April 1980 that he expected intervention to create some 18,000 
jobs over the next four years, it was pointed out that there had been at least 44,000 
redundancies in the previous ten months.
73
 However, this does not mean that interventions 
were unsuccessful. An alternative scenario where little or no intervention was carried out 
would have resulted in a significantly worse situation, given that land would not have been 
cleared in most cases, nor factories constructed, while many companies may not have been 
willing to invest in the absence of financial support. However, assessing how many jobs were 
created is an impossible task as full evaluations were not carried out,
74
 while many of the 
reported job creation totals were estimates. For example, central government's National Audit 
Office noted in 1991 that the Welsh Office and its agencies ‘cannot assess the extent to which 
these initiatives have influenced the overall trends in the labour market. Nor can they assess 
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the economic position Wales would have reached without those initiatives '...' It is therefore 
very difficult to evaluate the full success of these initiatives.’75 
 
While intervention can be very effective, sustained economic growth is not automatically in 
the gift of any government, especially of a department such as the Welsh Office. While more 
intervention may have been beneficial in some respects, it would not have automatically led 
to better commercial outcomes. For example, there would have been little point in building 
more advance factories without tenants to fill them. At the same time, while the provision of 
more capital to investing companies would have increased the level of commercial activity, a 
lack of viable companies might have led to greater losses. However, an area where more 
could and should have been done was the service sector, although identifying interventions 
that could have been more successful is far from easy. In many ways, interventionist 
apparatus and methods were geared towards manufacturing, with relatively limited attention 
being paid to the service sector. 
 
If it can be accepted that intervention was necessary and worthwhile, then an obvious 
question is: why did Wales remain relatively poor after so much effort? There are at least 
three answers to this question. Firstly, the loss of so many jobs in manufacturing, steel and 
coal was so great a shock that any administration, especially one with limited powers, would 
find it exceptionally difficult to redevelop the economy. In some ways, the size of this shock 
meant that Wales was running up the down escalator for much of the period. Secondly, while 
Wales’ had great success in attracting FDI, its volume relative to the economy as a whole was 
insufficient to offset the jobs that had been lost. Finally, Wales proved unable to develop 
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enough home-grown businesses. Overall, although the Welsh Office was unsuccessful in 
charting a self-sustaining growth path, it was successful in effectively and energetically using 
its limited resources to partially offset the impact of economic change. 
 
